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Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility is a pair hN, vi, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players and v : 2 N → R is a characteristic function satisfying v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N, v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e. the members of S can obtain a total payoff of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate.
A game hN, vi is called
Clearly, each convex game is also superadditive. The class of convex games was introduced by Shapley (1971) and has attracted a lot of attention because the games in this class have very nice properties: for example, the core of a convex game is the unique stable set and its extreme points can be easily described; moreover, the Shapley value is in the barycenter of the core. The purpose of this note is to provide a new characterization (to the best of our knowledge) of convex games that uses the notion of a marginal game.
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Given a game hN, vi and a coalition T ⊆ N, the T -marginal game v T :
Marginal games turned out to be very useful not only for proving the fact that the core of a game is a subset of its Weber set (cf. Weber (1988) Since v {1} ({2, 3}) = 2
However, as we will show next, the superadditivity of each marginal game hN \ T, v T i of an original game hN, vi pushes the game hN, vi to satisfy a stronger property -that of convexity. Proof. (i) Suppose hN, vi is convex and let T ⊆ N . Take
where the inequality follows from the convexity of v. Hence, v T is convex (and superadditive as well).
(ii) Suppose that for each T ∈ 2 N the game hN \ T, v T i is superadditive.
Take S 1 , S 2 ⊆ N. We have to prove that
If S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅, then the assertion easily follows from the superadditivity of the game hN \ ∅, v ∅ i = hN, vi and v(∅) = 0.
Suppose now S 1 ∩ S 2 6 = ∅ and let T := S 1 ∩ S 2 . Because hN \ T, v T i is superadditive, we have that
Having provided our characterization, we can answer immediately the 
